The  Tie  Goes to the State in Kansas v. Marsh: A Small Victory for Proponents of the Death Penalty by Flores, Carrie L.
Valparaiso University Law Review 
Volume 42 
Number 2 Winter 2008 pp.675-686 
Winter 2008 
The "Tie" Goes to the State in Kansas v. Marsh: A Small Victory for 
Proponents of the Death Penalty 
Carrie L. Flores 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Carrie L. Flores, The "Tie" Goes to the State in Kansas v. Marsh: A Small Victory for Proponents of the 
Death Penalty , 42 Val. U. L. Rev. 675 (2008). 
Available at: https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol42/iss2/7 
This Comment is brought to you for free and open access 
by the Valparaiso University Law School at ValpoScholar. 
It has been accepted for inclusion in Valparaiso 
University Law Review by an authorized administrator of 
ValpoScholar. For more information, please contact a 
ValpoScholar staff member at scholar@valpo.edu. 
 675
Comment 
THE “TIE” GOES TO THE STATE IN KANSAS V. 
MARSH:  A SMALL VICTORY FOR 
PROPONENTS OF THE DEATH PENALTY∗1 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
The issue at the heart of capital punishment jurisprudence is 
whether imposing the death penalty violates the Eighth and Fourteenth 
Amendment prohibitions against cruel and unusual punishment.2  Over 
the last twenty-five years, the United States Supreme Court has 
approved the use of the death penalty as an acceptable means of 
punishing criminals for certain violent crimes, but it has set forth 
requirements which a state’s sentencing statute must meet to pass 
constitutional muster.3  For example, the statute must rationally reduce 
                                                 
∗  Winner of the 2007 Valparaiso University Law Review Case Comment Competition. 
1 See State v. Marsh, 102 P.3d 445, 457-58 (Kan. 2004) (finding that the weighing 
equation in Kansas’s death sentencing statute was unconstitutional because when the 
balance of aggravating and mitigating circumstances weigh equally, according to the 
statute, the “tie” goes to the State and the death penalty must be imposed; and conversely, 
holding that “fundamental fairness requires that a ‘tie goes to the defendant’ when life or 
death is at issue.”), rev’d, 126 S. Ct. 2516 (2006). 
2 See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (“No State shall . . .  deprive any person of life, 
liberty, or property, without due process of law[]”); U.S. CONST. amend. VIII (“Excessive 
bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments 
inflicted.”).  Public opinion in the United States concerning support for the death penalty 
has fluctuated over time.  Joshua Marquis, The Myth of Innocence, 95 J. CRIM. L. & 
CRIMINOLOGY 501, 501 (2005).  For example, it fell in the 1960s, rose with the increase of 
violent crime in the 1980s, and fell again in 2000.  Marquis, supra, at 501, 503.  Significantly, 
though, there has been a long history of Americans accepting the death penalty as 
punishment for the crime of murder.  See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 176 (1976).  
Furthermore, over the last quarter of a century, public support for the death penalty has 
been strong, ranging from sixty-five to eighty-five percent, indicating that a majority of 
people have long-favored it.  Marquis, supra, at 519. 
3 See, e.g., Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 305 (1976) (holding that because 
our criminal justice system is unavoidably susceptible to error, imposing the uniquely 
irreversible punishment by death requires utmost scrutiny to ensure that it is not cruel and 
unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment); Gregg, 428 U.S. at 189 (finding 
that “discretion must be suitably directed and limited so as to minimize the risk of wholly 
arbitrary and capricious action.”); Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 306 (1972) (Stewart, J., 
concurring) (noting that the death penalty is different in nature than any other punishment 
in our criminal justice system and that because of the finality of a death sentence, there 
exists an extraordinary need for reliability in the conclusion that death is the appropriate 
punishment in a specific case); Stephen J. Markman & Paul G. Cassell, Protecting the 
Innocent: A Response to the Bedau-Radelet Study, 41 STAN. L. REV. 121, 121, 146 (1988) 
(acknowledging, though actually advocating for capital punishment, that using the death 
penalty “entails some risk that an innocent person will be executed.”). 
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the class of death-eligible defendants and allow for an individualized 
sentencing determination based on the defendant’s personal features, 
criminal record, and the circumstances of the crime.4  The Court’s 
precedent further establishes that a state enjoys discretion in imposing 
the death penalty in a reasonable manner and in deciding how to weigh 
aggravating and mitigating factors surrounding the crime.5  Arguably, 
though, the Court’s decisions preceding Kansas v. Marsh concerning the 
weighing of aggravating and mitigating circumstances did not address 
all possible questions regarding permissible statutory language.6  Thus, 
the Court granted certiorari in Marsh to determine whether Kansas’s 
capital sentencing statute, which mandates that the death penalty be 
imposed when aggravating and mitigating factors are in “equipoise,” 
violates constitutional bans against cruel and unusual punishment.7 
                                                 
4 See Gregg, 428 U.S. at 189 (holding that when determining sentences, “justice generally 
requires” that the character and propensities of the offender and the circumstances of the 
offense be considered); Furman, 408 U.S. at 310 (Stewart, J., concurring) (noting that capital 
sentencing processes must take particularized mitigating factors into account to avoid 
“freakishly” imposing death sentences).  See generally Furman, 408 U.S. 238 (per curiam) 
(holding that the death penalty must not automatically be imposed upon all death-eligible 
defendants who commit a specific crime). 
5 Franklin v. Lynaugh, 487 U.S. 164, 179 (1988) (plurality opinion) (citing Zant v. 
Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 875-76 (1983)). 
6 See, e.g., Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639, 651-52 (1990) (upholding the 
constitutionality of a statute that mandates imposing the death penalty when one or more 
aggravating circumstances are present and mitigating circumstances do not outweigh 
aggravating circumstances); Boyde v. California, 494 U.S. 370, 374 (1990) (upholding the 
constitutionality of a statute that mandates imposing the death penalty when aggravating 
circumstances outweigh mitigating circumstances); Blystone v. Pennsylvania, 494 U.S. 299, 
307 (1990) (upholding the constitutionality of a statute that mandates imposing the death 
penalty when aggravating circumstances exist and no mitigating circumstances are 
present).  But see State v. Marsh, 102 P.3d at 457-58 (evaluating the constitutionality of 
Kansas’s sentencing statute, which mandates imposing the death sentence when mitigating 
circumstances do not outweigh aggravating circumstances – seemingly the same statutory 
language that the Supreme Court reviewed in Walton fourteen years earlier – and ruling 
that the statute violated the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments).  The Kansas Supreme 
Court noted that “a majority of the United States Supreme Court has never squarely 
addressed or decided the facial constitutionality of the equipoise provision before us” and 
explained that “[t]his remains true, no matter how . . .  courts have interpreted the ruling in 
Walton.  The Arizona statute at issue in that case was worded differently; and, . . .  Justice 
White’s plurality decision neither used the word ‘equipoise’ nor specifically referred to 
situations in which aggravators and mitigators are in balance.”).  Id. at 459. 
7 Kansas v. Marsh, 126 S. Ct. 2516, *2521 (2006).  The Court employs the term 
“equipoise” to refer to a jury’s conclusion that the balance of aggravating and mitigating 
circumstances weigh equally.  Id. at *2523. 
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In Marsh, the Court held that Kansas’s statute was constitutional.8  
This Comment first introduces the significant facts present in Marsh.9  
Second, this Comment discusses the legal background of capital 
sentencing jurisprudence, emphasizing the Court’s previous decisions 
involving the weighing of aggravating and mitigating factors.10  Finally, 
this Comment presents the Court’s holding in Marsh, arguing the 
appropriateness of the majority opinion and discussing the ruling’s 
significance in view of future death penalty cases.11 
II.  STATEMENT OF THE FACTS IN KANSAS V. MARSH 
One evening in June of 1996 when Marry Pusch (“Pusch”) returned 
to her home with her nineteen-month-old daughter, M. P., Michael 
Marsh (“Marsh”) shot Pusch in the head multiple times, stabbed her in 
the heart repeatedly, and slashed her throat.12  Then, Marsh applied 
accelerant to Pusch’s body and set fire to her house.13  He fled the scene, 
abandoning M. P., and the fire ultimately killed M. P.14  The jury at the 
district level convicted Marsh of the capital murder of M. P. and found 
that three aggravating circumstances existed, which were not 
outweighed by any mitigating circumstances.15  Therefore, the jury 
sentenced Marsh to death.16 
                                                 
8 Id. at *2520.  The Court also addressed two other issues in Marsh: whether it had 
jurisdiction to review the Kansas Supreme Court’s decision and whether adequate state 
grounds existed to support the Kansas Supreme Court’s judgment.  Id. at *2521-22.  It 
answered the first question in the affirmative and the second in the negative; thus, the 
Court had jurisdiction to hear the case, and the constitutional issue was properly before the 
Court.  Id. 
9 See infra Part II. 
10 See infra Part III. 
11 See infra Part IV. 
12 State v. Marsh, 102 P.3d 445, 452-53 (Kan. 2004), rev’d, 126 S. Ct. 2516 (2006).  When 
detectives interviewed him, Marsh admitted that he had broken into Pusch’s house ahead 
of time and that he had shot her; however, he indicated that his reason for being at the 
house was merely because he needed money for a trip to Alaska.  Id.  He told police that he 
had planned to surprise Pusch when she returned home, tie up Pusch and her infant, and 
hold them as hostages in exchange for ransom money from Pusch’s husband.  Id.  He 
alleged that his plan went “awry” because Pusch entered the house earlier than he had 
expected, causing him to panic and shoot her.  Id. at 453. 
13 Id. at 452-54. 
14 Id.  The fire caused severe burns to more than seventy-five percent of M. P.’s body 
and, while Marsh tried to argue that M. P.’s burns did not proximately cause her death, 
two medical experts – the treating physician and the coroner – testified that the burns and 
the resulting internal organ failure of M. P. caused her death.  Id. 
15 Id. at 453.  The three aggravating factors were: “(1) Marsh knowingly or purposely 
killed or created a great risk of death to more than one person; (2) he committed the crime 
in order to avoid or prevent a lawful arrest or prosecution; and (3) he committed the crime 
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On appeal, Marsh argued that Kansas’s capital sentencing statute is 
facially unconstitutional because it requires imposition of the death 
penalty in situations when aggravating and mitigating circumstances are 
in equipoise.17  The Kansas Supreme Court agreed and reversed and 
remanded Marsh’s capital murder conviction for a new trial.18  The 
Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider the constitutionality of 
Kansas’s sentencing statute which mandates that the death penalty be 
imposed when the balance of aggravating and mitigating circumstances 
weigh equally.19 
III.  LEGAL BACKGROUND OF KANSAS V. MARSH 
Historically, one of the most passionately debated issues concerning 
capital punishment is whether imposing the death penalty is a 
constitutional means of punishing criminals for certain crimes.20  The 
Constitution, though, actually supports the claim that capital 
punishment was accepted by the Framers.21  Furthermore, for at least 
two centuries, American courts have accepted capital punishment.22 
In 1972, in Furman v. Georgia, the Supreme Court called attention to 
the unique nature and finality of the death penalty and held that it must 
only be imposed according to carefully drafted procedures that minimize 
                                                                                                             
in an especially heinous, atrocious or cruel manner.”  Id.  The mitigating evidence consisted 
only of character witnesses.  Id. at 465.  The jury also convicted Marsh of the first-degree 
premeditated murder of Pusch, aggravated burglary, and aggravated arson.  Id. at 453, 466. 
16 Id. at 453.  The jury unanimously agreed to a death sentence for the murder of M. P.  
Id.  In addition, it sentenced Marsh to life imprisonment for forty years without the 
possibility of parole for the murder of Pusch and consecutive sentences totaling eighty-five 
months for the arson and burglary convictions.  Id. 
17 Id. at 458.  Marsh contested that the statute’s language prevents a jury from exercising 
discretion and expressing a “reasoned and moral response” to mitigating circumstances, 
thus violating the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments.  Id. 
18 Id. at 466.  The court also reversed and remanded Marsh’s aggravated arson 
conviction but affirmed Marsh’s burglary and premeditated murder convictions and 
sentences.  Id. 
19 Kansas v. Marsh, 126 S. Ct. 2516, *2520 (2006). 
20 See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 168-87 (1976) (noting that the courts have long-
discussed whether imposing the death penalty constitutes cruel and unusual punishment 
and discussing why capital punishment is not fundamentally unconstitutional); Furman v. 
Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 316-28 (1972) (Marshall, J., concurring) (reviewing the history of 
prohibiting cruel and unusual punishment). 
21 See Gregg, 428 U.S. at 177 (indicating that capital punishment was widely accepted 
when the Eighth Amendment was ratified). 
22 See Furman, 408 U.S. at 333 (Marshall, J., concurring) (“Capital punishment has been 
used to penalize various forms of conduct by members of society since the beginnings of 
civilization.”). 
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the risk of unjustly imposing punishment by death.23  Four years after 
Furman, more than thirty-five states had revised their death penalty 
statutes in an attempt to meet the goals set forth in Furman.24  In 1976, the 
Supreme Court began its present practice of approving capital 
sentencing statutes that meet the Furman goals.25 
Since 1976, the Supreme Court has continued to evaluate state 
sentencing statutes to determine whether they contain the necessary 
provisions to comply with the Constitution’s prohibitions against cruel 
                                                 
23 See id. at 313 (White, J., concurring) (discussing capital punishment and explaining 
that “there is no meaningful basis for distinguishing the few cases in which it is imposed 
from the many cases in which it is not” and arguing for increased consistency).  See 
generally Furman, 408 U.S. 238 (per curiam) (finding that imposing the death penalty 
according to Georgia’s sentencing statute constituted cruel and unusual punishment 
because the statute gave the jury unrestrained discretion to decide whether to impose the 
death penalty). 
24 See, e.g., Gregg, 428 U.S. at 179-80.  See Hugo Adam Bedau & Michael L. Radelet, 
Miscarriages of Justice in Potentially Capital Cases, 40 STAN. L. REV. 21, 89 (1987) (stating that 
capital sentencing procedures were significantly revised after Furman); Markman & Cassell, 
supra note 3, at 121, 146 (indicating that since the aftermath of Furman, many states have 
enacted laws that afford capital defendants increased protection against erroneous 
imposition of the death penalty); Rob Warden, Illinois Death Penalty Reform: How It 
Happened, What It Promises, 95 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 381, 386 (2005) (noting that in 
response to Furman, thirty-eight state legislatures have passed new capital sentencing laws 
with revised procedures that more appropriately address the problems discussed in 
Furman and safeguard against cruel and unusual punishment by bifurcating the trial and 
sentencing phases and by providing additional guidance to assist those charged with 
determining the sentencing of a death-eligible defendant).  The thirty-seven states that 
currently have death penalty laws are “Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado, 
Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Kansas, Kentucky, 
Louisiana, Maryland, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, 
New Jersey, New Mexico, North Carolina, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, South 
Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Virginia, Washington, and Wyoming.”  
Warden, supra, at 386 n.27. 
25 See, e.g., Gregg, 428 U.S. at 168-69 (addressing the question left unresolved by Furman 
concerning whether punishment by death for the crime of murder is always “cruel and 
unusual[,]” the Court held that “punishment of death does not invariably violate the 
Constitution” and upheld Georgia’s revised sentencing statute) (emphasis added); Jurek v. 
Texas, 428 U.S. 262, 268, 276-77 (1976) (upholding Texas’s revised capital sentencing statute 
because it (1) required at least one aggravating factor to exist before a death sentence could 
be imposed, (2) permitted the sentencing authority to consider mitigating factors relating to 
the individual defendant, and (3) provided for prompt judicial review of a death sentence 
by a court with statewide jurisdiction).  But see, e.g., Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325, 331 
(1976) (striking down Louisiana’s mandatory capital sentencing statute because it fails to 
give the jury an opportunity to consider mitigating circumstances surrounding the 
commission of the murder); Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 296-97, 301 (1976) 
(striking down North Carolina’s capital sentencing statute because it automatically applies 
the death penalty to everyone convicted of first degree murder and does not permit the 
jury to determine the character and records of the individual defendants who are 
convicted) (citing Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 247 (1949)). 
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and unusual punishment.26  The Supreme Court has heard several cases 
involving aggravating and mitigating factors and has acknowledged a 
state constitutional right to impose the death penalty; however, 
arguably, uncertainty still existed as to whether a state could statutorily 
mandate imposing the death penalty where the balance of aggravating 
and mitigating circumstances are in equipoise.27  Therefore, in 2006, the 
Court granted certiorari in Marsh to evaluate and determine the 
constitutionality of Kansas’s sentencing statute, which requires 
imposition of the death penalty if aggravating and mitigating 
circumstances weigh equally.28 
IV.  ANALYSIS OF THE DECISION IN KANSAS V. MARSH 
A. The Kansas v. Marsh Decision 
In a 5-4 decision, the Supreme Court upheld Kansas’s capital 
sentencing statute and determined that it did not violate the Eighth and 
                                                 
26 See, e.g., Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 555, 560 (2005) (holding that imposing the 
death penalty on juvenile persons under the age of eighteen is unconstitutional); Atkins v. 
Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 318-20, 321 (2002) (holding that imposing the death penalty on 
persons who are mentally retarded is unconstitutional); Melissa A. Waters, Mediating 
Norms and Identity: The Role of Transnational Judicial Dialogue in Creating and Enforcing 
International Law, 93 GEO. L.J. 487, 487 (2005) (noting that Justice Kennedy, writing for the 
majority in Roper, cited international practices “as evidence of ‘the overwhelming weight of 
international opinion against the juvenile death penalty.’”). 
27 See supra note 6 and accompanying text (discussing Walton, Boyde, and Blystone, in 
which the Court upheld sentencing statutes involving weighing of aggravating and 
mitigating circumstances and setting forth the argument in Marsh, in which the petitioner 
asserted that the Court had never specifically ruled on the constitutionality of a statute that 
mandates the death penalty when the balance of aggravating and mitigating circumstances 
is in equipoise); Franklin v. Lynaugh, 487 U.S. 164, 179 (1988) (plurality opinion) (“[W]e 
have never held that a specific method for balancing mitigating and aggravating factors in 
a capital sentencing proceeding is constitutionally required.”) (citing Zant v. Stephens, 462 
U.S. 862, 875-76 (1983)).  But see McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 304 (1987) (quoting 
Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 604 (1978)) (Burger, C. J., plurality) (“The sentencer . . .  
[cannot] be precluded from considering, as a mitigating factor, any aspect of a defendant’s 
character or record and any of the circumstances of the offense that the defendant proffers 
as a basis for a sentence less than death.”) (emphasis in original); Skipper v. South Carolina, 
476 U.S. 1, 4 (1986) (ruling that precluding testimony by the petitioner concerning “his 
good behavior” during the time he was in jail pending trial was unconstitutional because 
the jury should have been able to consider the testimony as a potentially mitigating factor) 
(citing Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 110 (1982)) (noting that a sentencing statute 
must permit the jury to evaluate mitigating factors). 
28 Kansas v. Marsh, 126 S. Ct. 2516, *2521 (2006).  Though the challenged statute was 
enacted in 1994, no one has actually been executed in Kansas since 1965 (before Furman v. 
Georgia).  David Klepper, Court Actions Have Mixed Impact in Two States: Death Penalty 
Restored in Kansas, KAN. CITY STAR, June 27, 2006, at A1. 
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Fourteenth Amendment bans against cruel and unusual punishment.29  
The Court first held that its decision in Walton v. Arizona required 
approval of Kansas’s statute.30  Second, the Court explained that its 
general death penalty jurisprudence further supported the determination 
that Kansas’s statute was constitutional.31  Finally, the Court argued that 
the dissent’s contention concerning the advent of DNA evidence was 
wholly irrelevant to the narrow question before the Court.32  These three 
central holdings are examined in turn. 
Writing for the majority, Justice Thomas, joined by four members of 
the Court, first discussed Walton.33  Walton had argued that Arizona’s 
sentencing statute was unconstitutional because it mandated imposition 
of the death penalty if mitigating circumstances did not outweigh 
aggravating circumstances.34  The Court, however, held that a sentencing 
statute could require a defendant to prove that mitigating circumstances 
outweigh aggravating circumstances; additionally, it emphasized that a 
critical factor is that the sentencing authority must be permitted to 
consider any mitigating evidence.35  Justice Thomas concluded that 
Walton controlled the issue presented in Marsh and, based on Walton, 
Kansas’s statute was constitutional because it did not prevent the 
sentencing authority from considering mitigating evidence.36 
                                                 
29 Marsh, 126 S. Ct. at *2520 (2006). 
30 Id. at *2520.  See Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639, 651-52 (1990) (holding that Arizona’s 
death penalty statute, which placed the burden on the defendant to prove that mitigating 
circumstances outweighed aggravating circumstances, was constitutional). 
31 Marsh, 126 S. Ct. at *2524.  In his concurring opinion, though, Justice Scalia states that 
while he agrees that a review of the capital sentencing jurisprudence leads to a 
determination that Kansas’s statute is constitutional, he believes that Walton so clearly 
controls the issue in Marsh that the jurisprudence discussion is unnecessary.  Id. at *2530 
(Scalia, J., concurring). 
32 Id. at *2528. 
33 Id. at *2520.  Roberts, C. J., and Scalia, Kennedy, and Alito, JJ., joined the majority 
opinion, and Scalia, J., wrote a fairly lengthy concurring opinion; Stevens, J., penned a 
dissenting opinion, and Souter, J., wrote a dissenting opinion which was joined by Stevens, 
Ginsburg, and Breyer, JJ.  Id. at *2529, 2539. 
34 Id. at *2522-24. 
35 Id.  Marsh claimed that Walton did not specifically address the equipoise issue and, in 
fact, Marsh accurately asserted that the actual term “equipoise” did not appear in Walton’s 
majority opinion.  Id. at *2523.  Therefore, Marsh alleged that Walton could not control the 
issue concerning the constitutionality of Kansas’s sentencing statute which requires that the 
death penalty be applied in the event of equipoise.  Id. 
36 Id.  The Court pointedly noted that the dissenting opinion in Walton unmistakably 
established that the equipoise issue was indeed presented to the Court and resolved.  Id. 
(quoting Walton, 497 U.S. 639, 687-88 (1990)) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (“If the mitigating 
and aggravating circumstances are in equipoise, the [Arizona] statute requires that the trial 
judge impose capital punishment.”).  Id. 
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To further support the holding that Kansas’s sentencing statute is 
constitutional, Justice Thomas next reviewed the Court’s general death 
penalty jurisprudence, discussing numerous cases decided over a thirty 
year span beginning with Furman.37  The Court determined that Kansas’s 
statute was constitutional because it rationally reduced the class of 
death-eligible defendants and permitted a sentencing authority to 
perform an individualized sentencing determination and to consider 
mitigating circumstances.38 
Finally, Justice Thomas criticized the dissent’s assertion that the 
developments in the field of DNA testing somehow affected the issue as 
to the constitutionality of Kansas’s death sentencing statute.39  Justice 
                                                 
37 Id. at *2524-28 (citing Franklin v. Lynaugh, 487 U.S. 164, 179 (1988) (plurality opinion) 
(in turn citing Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 875-76 (1983))) (indicating that as long as a 
death sentencing statute logically narrows the class of death-eligible defendants and allows 
a sentencing authority to perform an individualized sentencing determination, a state may 
exercise discretion in imposing the death penalty in a reasonable manner and in deciding 
how to weigh the aggravating and mitigating circumstances of the crime); Gregg v. 
Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976); Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972); Lockett v. Ohio, 438 
U.S. 586, 604 (1978) (plurality opinion of Burger, C. J.) (holding that a sentencing statute 
must allow the jury an opportunity to consider mitigating evidence).  See supra note 4 and 
accompanying text (discussing the requirements for individualized sentencing noted in 
Gregg and Furman). 
38 Marsh, 126 S. Ct. at *2525-26 (finding that “Kansas’[s] procedure narrows the universe 
of death-eligible defendants” and indicating that “[u]nder Kansas law, imposition of the 
death penalty is an option only after a defendant is convicted of capital murder . . .  .”) .  
“The system in Kansas provides the type of ‘guided discretion’ we have sanctioned in 
Walton, Boyde, and Blystone.”  Id. at *2526 (internal citation omitted).  For example, in Boyde, 
Boyde contested the sentencing statute at issue, arguing that because it mandated imposing 
the death penalty in the event aggravating circumstances outweighed mitigating 
circumstances, it precluded individualized sentencing.  Id. at *2526-27.  Nonetheless, the 
Boyde Court held that the mandatory provision of the statute did not prevent the 
sentencing authority from considering any mitigating circumstances, thus making the 
statute constitutional.  Id. at *2526-27 (citing Boyde v. California, 494 U.S. 370, 374 (1990)). 
39 See id. at *2528-29.  The dissenting opinion states, “Today, a new body of fact must be 
accounted for in deciding what . . .  the Eighth Amendment . . .  should tolerate, for the 
period starting in 1989 has seen repeated exonerations of convicts under death sentences, in 
numbers never imagined before the development of DNA tests.”  Marsh, 126 S. Ct. at *2544 
(Souter, J., dissenting).  But see id. at *2533 (Scalia, J., concurring) (indicating that Souter’s 
dissent irresponsibly and incorrectly characterizes as significant the impact that DNA 
testing has had with regard to the exoneration of death-eligible defendants).  Scalia notes 
that the dissent cannot point to “a single verifiable case” in which a defendant was 
erroneously executed and discusses numerous problems with the studies that the dissent 
cites, criticizing the dissent for accepting “anybody’s say-so.”  Id. at *2529-39 (citing 
Markman & Cassell, supra note 3, at 121, 131) (reviewing numerous problems in several of 
the cases that are cited in the study that is relied upon by the dissent).  Scalia expresses 
disappointment that the dissent cites such questionable studies and that, as a result, those 
baseless studies will appear in the United States Reports.  Id. at *2529-39.  See also Markman 
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Thomas indicated that the dissenting view was irrelevant because it 
exceeded the scope of the issue presented.40  In other words, in 
determining the constitutionality of Kansas’s death sentencing statute, 
the majority felt it was not necessary to argue in favor of or in opposition 
to the death penalty.41 
B. Appraisal of the Kansas v. Marsh Decision 
The Court in Marsh reached the correct result.42  Kansas’s death 
penalty statute does not raise a presumption in favor of death because it 
(1) does not prevent the jury from considering any mitigating factors, (2) 
sets forth that the imposition of the death penalty is merely an “option” 
after a defendant is convicted beyond a reasonable doubt of a capital 
offense, and (3) requires that at least one aggravating factor be present in 
order for the mandatory death penalty to be imposed.43  Therefore, 
                                                                                                             
& Cassell, supra note 3, at 150 (“There is, in short, no persuasive evidence that any innocent 
person has been put to death in more than twenty-five years.”). 
40 Marsh, 126 S. Ct. at *2528 (majority opinion).  Additionally, Justice Scalia’s concurrence 
sharply criticizes Justice Souter’s dissenting opinion.  Id. at *2531-39 (Scalia, J., concurring).  
He starts with, “[a]s a general rule, I do not think it appropriate for judges to heap either 
praise or censure upon a legislative measure that comes before them, . . .  .” and continues, 
“[t]he dissenters’ proclamation of their policy agenda in the present case is especially 
striking because it is nailed to the door of the wrong church-that is, set forth in a case 
litigating a rule that has nothing to do with the evaluation of guilt or innocence.”  Id. at 
*2532.  He leads up to a strong finish by noting that “American people have determined 
that the good to be derived from capital punishment-in deterrence, and perhaps most of all 
in the meting out of condign justice for horrible crimes-outweighs the risk of error.”  Id. at 
*2539.  He wraps up with “[i]t is no proper part of the business of this Court, or of its 
Justices, to second-guess that judgment, much less to impugn it before the world, and less 
still to frustrate it by imposing judicially invented obstacles to its execution.”  Id. 
41 Marsh, 126 S. Ct. at *2528-29 (majority opinion).  While it was not at issue in this case, 
the validity of the death penalty is still largely debated.  See, e.g., Marsh, 126 S. Ct.  at *2541-
46 (Souter, J., dissenting) (rejecting the death penalty generally); Hugo Adam Bedau & 
Michael L. Radelet, The Myth of Infallibility: A Reply to Markman and Cassell, 41 STAN. L. REV. 
161 (1988) (arguing in support of their 1987 study, which discussed problems with 
imposing the death penalty and was heavily criticized by Markman & Cassell, supra note 3, 
at 121); Bedau & Radelet, supra note 24, at 90 (arguing that imposing the death penalty is an 
inappropriate way of punishing even those persons who are convicted of the crime of 
murder). 
42 Based on Walton v. Arizona, the Court properly decided Marsh.  See supra note 36, at 
*2522-24 (reviewing that Walton squarely dealt with a statute that required the imposition 
of the death penalty when aggravating and mitigating circumstances are in equipoise, and 
thus, in line with stare decisis, its ruling controls Marsh); Boyde, 494 U.S. at 374 (1990) 
(noting that statutory language requiring mandatory imposition of the death penalty in the 
event of equipoise did not preclude the sentencing authority from considering mitigating 
circumstances; thus, the statute was constitutional). 
43 See Marsh, 126 S. Ct. at *2526-27 (citing Boyde, 494 U.S. 370, 377 (1990); Blystone v. 
Pennsylvania, 494 U.S. 299, 305 (1990) (emphasis omitted)).  The Court’s decisions in Boyde 
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Kansas’s sentencing system does not remove the jury’s discretion, but 
merely supports the jury’s “guided discretion[.]”44  The Constitution 
requires that a sentencing authority have discretion when determining 
whether capital punishment is appropriate in a particular case, but it 
does not require that such discretion be unfettered.45  Thus, the Court’s 
ruling in Marsh was appropriate and squarely supported by death 
penalty jurisprudence. 
C. Anticipated Consequences of the Kansas v. Marsh Decision 
The makeup of the Court played a significant role in Marsh.46  Over 
the years, the Court had been evenly split on death penalty issues and, 
preceding Marsh, uncertainty grew as to whether Justice O’Connor 
would support capital punishment.47  Because Justice Alito replaced 
                                                                                                             
and Blystone did not turn on the predominance of aggravating over mitigating 
circumstances but, instead, the key factor was that the jury was able to consider any 
relevant mitigating factors.  Id. at *2526-27.  Similarly, a key factor in deciding Marsh was 
that the statute allowed the jury to consider mitigating circumstances.  But see id. at *2542-
44 (Souter, J., dissenting) (arguing that a law with a mandatory provision “requir[ing] 
execution when the case for aggravation has failed to convince the sentencing jury is 
morally absurd[]” and produces the “wanton and freakish results[]” that Furman v. Georgia 
and its progeny have declared unconstitutional).  In contrast, Justice Thomas points out 
that while the statute’s mandatory provision could appear to create a presumption of death 
if read in isolation, the provision should be evaluated within the context of the full capital 
sentencing statute as well as Kansas’s entire capital punishment system.  Id. at *2527 n.6 
(majority opinion) (noting that a capital sentencing statute must be reviewed within the 
context of the capital punishment system). 
44 See id. at *2526.  Contra Marsh, 126 S. Ct. at *2540 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“If it were 
true that this instruction may make the difference between life and death in a case in which 
the scales are otherwise evenly balanced, that is a reason why the instruction should not be 
given-not a reason for giving it.”).  In his dissenting opinion in Marsh, Justice Stevens 
further argues that in a situation in which the aggravating and mitigating factors weigh 
equally (i.e. equipoise), a situation which he classifies as one in which the jury has “doubt” 
as to whether the death penalty is appropriate, it is “fundamentally wrong” for a jury to 
choose the death penalty.  Id. 
45 See id. at *2523 (majority opinion) (citing Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639, 652 (1990)) 
(indicating that states retain authority to determine the manner in which a sentencing 
authority will consider mitigating circumstances). 
46 See Stephen Henderson, Ruling in Kan. May Show Shift by Court on Death Penalty, 
PHILA. INQUIRER, June 27, 2006, at A06 (suggesting that Chief Justice Roberts and Justice 
Alito provided the “pivotal votes” in Marsh, and Justice Alito’s vote was “decisive”); 
Klepper, supra note 28, at A1 (indicating that in response to a question asked by the media, 
Marsh’s public defender said that the holding “very much depended on the makeup of the 
court.”). 
47 See Henderson, supra note 46, at A06 (suggesting that Justice O’Connor’s “doubts 
about capital punishment had grown in recent years.”). 
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Justice O’Connor, his vote in Marsh was critical to the 5-4 outcome.48  The 
ruling, indicating that the Court is likely to demonstrate support for the 
death penalty in future cases, is disappointing for death penalty 
abolitionists.49  Nonetheless, opponents of capital punishment note the 
narrowness of the Court’s holding and assert that it will not significantly 
impact future death penalty jurisprudence.50 
V.  CONCLUSION 
In this country, where the death penalty has long been favored by a 
majority of Americans as a means of punishing violent criminals for 
committing murder, Marsh represents a small victory for death penalty 
advocates.  Its holding may seem trivial on its face, but it is significant 
because it marks a shift of increased deference to the states by the United 
States Supreme Court concerning the imposition of the death penalty.  
Based on Marsh, states will now have an easier time imposing the death 
penalty as long as a state rationally reduces the class of death-eligible 
defendants and allows for an individualized sentencing determination 
based on the circumstances of the crime.  Marsh reaffirms that as long as 
it acts in a reasonable manner, a state enjoys discretion in imposing the 
death penalty and in deciding how the jury should weigh aggravating 
and mitigating factors surrounding the crime.  Marsh sends a strong 
message both to criminals convicted of murder, like Mr. Michael Marsh, 
                                                 
48 See id. (forecasting that Marsh indicates that the Court’s two “new justices will tip the 
balance away from tighter restrictions on capital punishment”); Klepper, supra note 28, at 
A1 (mentioning that Justice Alito’s vote was critical and indicating that the public defender 
who represented Marsh said that Justice Alito definitely “broke the tie.”). 
49 See Henderson, supra note 46, at A06 (suggesting that Marsh’s ruling is a “blow” to 
those who oppose the death penalty because it suggests how the “new court” may vote on 
larger capital punishment questions). 
50 See Klepper, supra note 28, at A1 (arguing that Marsh “won’t do much to settle the 
thorny question of capital punishment[,]” mentioning that the holding is not likely to have 
much affect on substantive death penalty issues because of its narrow and technical scope, 
and indicating that the opposite ruling would have had more of an impact on future death 
penalty cases).  But see Henderson, supra note 46, at A06 (discussing that it is likely that the 
ruling will be telltale of how the current Court will “split” on future death penalty issues).  
Additionally, death penalty abolitionists hope that someday DNA testing will prove that 
capital punishment is evil because of its risk of erroneously executing innocent people.  
James Dao, DNA Ties Man Executed in ‘92 to the Murder He Denied, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 13, 2006, 
at A14.  In a recent case in 2006, Governor Warner ordered DNA testing to determine the 
guilt or innocence of a former death row prisoner who was executed in 1992.  Id.  To the 
dismay of those against the death penalty, the DNA testing actually confirmed the 
executed prisoner’s guilt.  Id.  Still, those who oppose the death penalty hope that similar 
testing will prove the innocence of future death row inmates.  Id.  They hope that other 
governors will follow Governor Warner’s lead and order similar DNA tests for other 
current or former death row inmates. Id. 
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who shot Ms. Marry Pusch in the head multiple times and then burned 
her infant child to death, and to death penalty abolitionists.  The current 
Court will likely continue to ensure that states have authority to expand 
the reach of the death penalty and protect the citizens of this country 
from heinous and evil murder. 
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